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ABSTRACT
The past year has been one of unprecedented change for the
U.S. military organization. It would be of interest to analyze the
impact of the changing situation on the U.S. military labor demand.
In this thesis, several aemand models for U.S. military labor are
considered to identify those influential factors that best predict
the size of the future military. A stepwise regression analysis is
used to select some significant demand models. Data used to
construct demand models in this thesis cover the period of 1963-
1986, while actual data (1987-1990) are used to check model
validity. Demand models selected are used to simulate force levels
through the year 2000 under various scenarios.
Major contributions of this thesis are employing international
security (war casualties), USSR' s military end-strength and the past
year's U.S. end-strength in the prediction models for military
labor demand. The resulting demand models turn out to be more
parsimonious but they provide better predictions than the existing
model. The results of simulations based on various scenarios
regarding war casualties and USSR's end-strength will provide
policy makers with useful information for the future defense
manpower plan. Accession For
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The past year has been one of unprecedented change for the
U.S. military organization. The destruction of the Berlin wall and
the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact find the U.S. armed forces in
a significantly different posture than it was a year ago. In light
of changes in the current world political situations, one can
expect corresponding alterations in the magnitude and structure of
the defense budget. A major impact of reduced international
political tensions may be a reduction of U.S. military labor
demand. Under such circumstances, it is of interest to analyze the
impact of the changing situations on U.S. military labor demand. In
view of the extensive budget allocated for defense manpower, the
necessity of an accurate forecasting model for military labor
demand cannot be overemphasized. However, most military manpower
research(Fisher [Ref i, Ash, et al tRef 2], Brown [Ref 3]) has
focused on the determinants of the supply of military labor,
especially on the impact cf various forms of military compensation
and the business cycle on enlistment. Only one major study, Deboer
and Prorsen [Ref 4] has been done on the demand side of the
As a part of an econometrics model, Deboer and Brorsen [Ref 4]
recently proposed a demand model as a function of military pay, the
rental price of military equipment and structures, civilian
government pay, GNP, Vietnam war casualties, and dummy variables
representing the presidential administrations. In view of the large
number of variables considered in their model, multicorrlinearity
among predictors, as indicated by authors, caused difficulties in
interpreting regression parameters. In addition, there are several
factors that their demand model did not take into account: the
changing international political situations, such as disintegration
of Warsaw pact, and the previous years' U.S. military labor demand.
B. OBJECTIVE
In this thesis, we attempt to find parsimonious military labor
demand models that include not only domestic changes but also
changes in international security. The proposed demand models can,
in turn, be used as a basis for the econometrics model that has
been developed previously by Deboer and Brorsen (Ref 4].
We expect to use the resulting model to identify influential
factors on military labor demand for the United States and to
simulate force levels through the year 2000 under various scenarios
reArding the selected predictors. These results will provide
policy makers with useful information regarding the future plan for
defense manpower.
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C. THE SCOPE OF THESIS
The following gives the outline of the rest of the thesis.
A brief literature survey on military labor models is provided
along with Deboer and Brorsen's model [Ref 4] in Chapter II.
In Chapter III, several candidate predictors are introduced to
fomulate demand models for military labor. In addition, models are
selected based on the stepwise regression analysis and compared to
Deboer and Brorsen's model (Ref 4]. Based on the selected models,
simulation studies are performed to predict the future demand for
military labor in Chapter Iv. Finally, in Chapter V, a summary of




First, general studies related to military manpower models are
briefly reviewed in section A. In section B, details regarding
Deboer and Brorsen's model [Ref 4] that motivated this study are
summarized.
A. MILITARY MANPOWER MODELS
By and larae, military manpower models in the literature can
be classified into either supply models or demand models. There
have been numerous investigations that have focused on finding
influential factors that might induce the supply of military labor.
Such studies include factor analysis of job satisfaction [Ref 11],
recruitment [Ref 12] and reenlistment [Ref 13] . Many of these
studies have used the following surveys conducted by the Defense
Manpower Data Center (DMDC) [Ref 14]:
1. The 1985 DOD survey of officer and enlisted personnel
- a world-wide survey of approximately 132000 activeduty
military members.
The 1985 DOD suu;ey of military spouses
- a survey of the spouses of all married members selected
for th- member s ,z--ev.
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Brief summaries of the previous work are as follows:
Using the DOD (Department of Defense) surveys, Manggolo [Ref I1]
investigated the relationship between race and job satisfaction.
Samples used were black, hispanic and white enlistees in all four
branches of service. The results of bivariate analysis, factor
analysis and regression analysis indicated that black enlistees'
levels of job satisfaction were significantly lower than thos.e of
other races.
There was an effort by Sullivan [Ref 12] to analyze
differences and similarities in reenlistment factors for prior
active service (FS) and non-prior active service (NFS) reservists.
Reenlistment factors examined were demographic factors, tenure,
cognitive and affective orientation, family income, civilian work
environment, and perceived alternative job opportunities. Sullivan
[Ref 12] found that the qualitative aspects of the reserve job and
the civilian employer's attitude towards reserve participation were
important variables to both PS and NPS reservists. In addition,
satisfaction with pay, problems associated with obtaining
transportation to and from drill sites, the amount of time spent on
i:eserve duties, and the lenath of time to promotion turned out to
h- important factors considered by the reservist in making the
reenlistmentmt decision.
In a similar context, Lucas [Ref 12] examined influences on
the enlistment an- . ref-listmen , J T) - - n the TT
Army. Frevious lna-T, e e:: rer hence, ethnicit. I-- gender, and
ecatir .....level -,f th respondent were -'.ni'ere. his study.
The analysis attempted to determine the differences between the
linguists surveyed and appropriate control groups. The result
indicated that the three most prominent reasons given for enlisting
were a chance to better one's self, to earn money for college, and
to receive training in a skill. Results further indicate that
monetary benefits such as the Army's new enlistment, specialty,
increased reenlistment bonuses strongly influenced the soldier's
reenlistment decision.
The studies mentioned above all used micro-level(individual)
data to estimate their models. Several other authors (Fisher(Ref 1],
Ash, Udis, McNown (Ref 2], and Brown[Ref 3]) used aggregate data to
develop supply models of military labor using predictors such as
GNP and population. In these models, it was assumed that an
individual's decision to enlist depends on a comparison between the
returns to enlistment and the returns to the best civilian
alternative: The ratio of military to civilian expected income
streams was positively related to enlistment.
In sum, The studies using micro-level data found that the
opportunity for better training and the opportunity to fulfill
self-esteem can be considered as important factors for the supply
of military labor. The studies using aggregate-level data found
that population (possibly by race), the percentage variation of
real GNP, and the military-civilian pay ratio are important
factors.
6
B. DEBOER AD BRORSEN'S MODEL
1. Demand Model
As we observed in the previous section, most of the research
on military manpower has been focused on the 3upply side of
military labor market. Less work has been done on the demand side
of the military labor market, which has been treated implicitly as
exogenous. If the DOD set personnel levels and enlistment goals
based on purely military and strategy considerations, ignoring
demand would make sense. But such is not a case.
In recent study, Deboer and Brorsen [Ref 4] considered the
military manpower demand and supply models simultaneously. Deboer
and Brorsen developed a system of equations representing military
labor demand and supply for the United States over the 1955-86
period, and used the results to simulate force levels, enlistments
and relative pay through the year 2000 under virious economic
assumptions.
Specifically, Deboer and Brorsen's study [Ref 4] looked at how
military labor demand and supply were equilibrated during the draft
era and how it was equilibrated during the all-volunteer system.
Data for the U.S. armed forces 1955-86 [Ref 8] were used to obtain
the size of the U.S. military. All variables were measured on a
federal fiscal year basis July through June before 1976, October
through September since then. All the financial data were adjusted
by the 1982 fiscl year lsis. Tndii' ani '-... . istments for
fiscal years 1960-P5 were from variou iss,1e- of ' Fureau of the
Census Statisticel Abstract of the U.S. [Ref 8]
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Enlistments were defined as the sum of non-prior service male
volunteers and voluntary reserve activations. Inductions included
draftees and involuntary reserve activations. End-strength was
based on the total active duty military personnel as of the end of
each fiscal year.
In their demand model of end-strength, the following
independent variables were used:
ES= D(MILPAY, EQUIP, STRUC, CIVPAY, GNP, WAR, KENJOHN, NIXFORD,
CARTER, REAGAN)
Where
ES: end strength, the annual end-of-year level of active
personnel in the armed forces, in thousands;
MILPAY: military pay divided by the GNP consumption deflator;
EQUIP : the rental price of military equipment divided by the GNP
consumption deflator;
STRUC: the rental price of military structures divided by the GNP
consumption deflator;
CIVPAY: civilian government pay divided by the GNP consumption
deflator;
GNP: real per capita gross national product;
WAR: Vietnam war casualties, in thousands;
KENJOHN: a dummy variable for the Kenneiy ?nd . "hi ' n
administrations, fiscal years 1962-1962;
NIXFOP: a dummy variable for the Nixon and Ford administrations,
8
fiscal years 1970-1977;
CARTER: a dummy variable for the Carter administration, fiscal
years 1978-1981;
REAGAN: a dummy variable for the Reagan administration fiscal
years 1982-1986;
Deboer and Brorsen [Ref 4] included dummy variables for four
presidential administrations to test for significant variations in
the taste for military labor in comparison to Eisenhower
administration.
2. Supply Model
Deboer and Brorsen [Ref 4] specified two supply
equations, one for enlistments and one for reenlistments.
First, high-quality enlistment supply is
ENLIST3 = S(POPI8, PAYRATIO, INPUT, GNPGAP, YEAR)
For the enlistment supply model, the number of 18 and 19 years
old males was included as the population variable (POP 18) [Ref 7]
since this group provided the bulk of first time enlistment to the
military.
Military compensation included a wide variety of pay and
benefits. Their study used basic pay rl e-isntit~en.. for enlisted
men, which included money pay and the ,alue of r,-ponsion benefits
received by soldiers below officer rank. Civilian pzy was measurel
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using the average compensation for non-military full-time
employees, available from the National Income and Product Accounts
(NIPA).
Their study also treated the pay ratio (PAYRATIO) as exogenous
in both the pre-1973 draft and post-1973 All-Volunteer Force
periods. The annual number of draftees through fiscal year 1973 was
included as an independent variable. The number of inductions
(INDUC) [Ref 8] was included rather than the draft probability
because the young male population was included as an independent
variable. Inductions were endogenous during the draft years when
the draft was used to equilibrate labor supply and demand. The
authors found that several other studies had shown that the draft
had a positive effect on enlistments, because it reduced expected
civilian pay, or because volunteers were offered a greater choice
of duty assignments than draftees.
In addition, the GNP gap (GNPGAP) [Ref 6] was used for the
enlistment supply model since one issue of interest was the
response of enlistments to the business cycle. The effect was
positive for expansions above trend, negative for recessions below
trend. Finally, a time trend (YEAR) was included to capture
possible systematic changes in the taste for military service.
The reenlistment supply model considered by Deboer and Brorsen
(Ref 41 is as follows:
RERATE: R(INDSEP, PAYRATIO, GNPCAFP
where
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RERATE: The reenlistment rate, the proportion of soldiers
eligible to reenlist (or separate) who reenlist;
INDSEP: The percentage of soldiers eligible to separate who were
drafted;
PAYRATIO: The ratio of enlisted basic pay plus enlistments to
civilian compensation per FTE;
GNPGAP: The percentage deviation of real GNP from trend.
Reenlistments were a second source of military labor supply.
The supply of soldiers eligible to reenlist was the number who had
reached the end of their terms of enlistment. Draftees were
expected to be less likely to reenlist than those who first
enlisted voluntarily, and a higher military-civilian pay ratio
would induce more reenlistments. Perceived opportunities for
civilian employment would also influence reenlistments, so the GNP
gap was included as an explanatory variable.
Finally, an identity equation was used to complete the
military labor model, relating military labor supply and the end-
strength demand:
ES = ENLIST3 + ENLIST4 + (RERAT * SEPARATE) + STOCK
Where
ENLIST4: The number of male recruits scoring below AFQT level III;
SEPARATE: The number of soldiers who are eligible to separate,
i.e., who'se enlistment peri-d.z have e -:I9-c,;
STOCK: The number of soldiers not eliuible to se>~ite.
II
III. DEMAND MODELS FOR U.S. MILITARY LABOR
A. MODEL
In view of the considerable amount of budget allocated to
military manpower and the consequences of under or over-estimating
military labor demand, the importance of accurate predictions of
end-strenath demand cannot be overemphasized. However, as observed
in the literature review, many studies have focused on the supply
side of military labor. Recently Deboer and Brorsen [Ref 4],
considered a demand equation explicitly modeled in conjunction with
supply models in the econometric analysis. However, their demand
model included relatively many predictors (Milpay, Equip, Struc,
Civpay, GNP, WAR, KenJohn, NixFord, Carter, Reagan). Inclusion of
many explanatory Hxariables often causes multi-collinearity. In
such a case, the role of each predictor on military labor demand
may not be clear. In addition, their demand model did not consider
potentially important predictors such as USSR's end-strength and
the past trend of U.S. end-strength.
In this chapter, an attempt is made to provide parsimonious
prediction models that can explain the variations in the demand for
U.S military lab'r. We first consider additional candidate
predictors such as USSP'end-strencTth ?n -h pZ .... end-strength
to a set of var:iables used in Peboer and Pr''res model. A
stepwise reqression analysis is used to select influential
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predictors out of many candidate variables. Details regarding
additional candidate predictors considered in this thesis are as
follows:
First, in view of the relationship between U.S. and USSR,
USSR's end-strength(USSRES) appears to be one of the important
variables that cannot be neglected as one of the predictors for US
military labor demand. This study established the following
hypotheses regarding the relationship between USSR'S End-strength
(USSPED) and U.S.'s End strength (ES) :
Hypothesis 1 As USSR's end-strength increases, the U.S.'s End-
strength also increases in order to balance the
power.
Hypothesis 2 : As USSR's end-strength increases, instead of
balancing the power by increasing the size of the
end-strength, U.S. would invest more money and
effort on high-tech scientific armament, which may
result in a decrease in End-strength within the
limited defense budget.
Second, in many cases, past history can be a good indicator of
the current situation. particularly, it takes time for a huge
organization to be adapted to sudden changes. Alterations in the
size of US military labor can be a oc'd examP! T 71 past year's
size of military labqr(ESl) can b- an influential iedjictor for the
current military labor.
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Third, a dummy variable (PARTY) can be used to distinguish the
different viewpoints of bipartisan administration on the demand of
military labor. A similar attempt was made in Deboer and Brorsen's
study [Ref 4] by considering each dummy variable for each
presidential administration. Using their approach, a more accurate
analysis of the differences among different presidential
administrations can be done. However, in order to predict demand
for military labor in the future, one has to define each future
administration in relation to five presidential administrations
that were used in their model. Use of one dummy variable
representing bipartisan administration can reduce this kind of
difficulty in the prediction.
In addition to these new variables, variables that were used
in Deboer and Brorsen's demand model were also considered as a set
of candidate predictors for a demand model for US military labor.
In sum, a set of candidate explanatory variables considered for a
military labor demand model in this thesis is as follows:
ES: United States End-strength, in thousands;
USSRES: USSR's End-strength, in thousands;
PARTY: Dummy Variable
=0 if president is democrat;
=1 if president is republican;
ESI: previous year's End-strenath for Thi.e - in
thousands;
MILFAY: military pay divided by the GNP cvns1mp, ior deflator;
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EQUIP: the rental price of military structures divided by the GNP
consumption deflator;
STRUC: the rental price of military structures divided by the GNP
consumption deflator;
CIVPAY: civilian government pay divided by the GNP consumption
deflator;
GNP: Per Capita Gross National Product in 1982 dollars;
WAR: War Casualties, in thousands.
B. DATA ANALYSIS
The data used for this thesis are based on the file that was
provided by Professors Deboer and Brorsen. This file was
originally edited using several different sources:
- U.S. armed forces 1955-1986 (ES,ESl)
- Various issues of U.S. Btreau of the Census (GNP)
- Statistical Abstract of the U.S. (MILPAY,CIVPAY)
Details regarding the derivation of each variable are as follows:
Total military pay (MILPAY) and civilian pay (CIVPAY) were
derived from employee compensation by industry from the National
Income and Product Accounts.
Military compensation (MILPAY) was divided by military full
time equivalent employment to derive total military pay. Civilian
pay (CIvPAY) was al.1 non-military c -, all non-
military FTE emplovment. Compensation 1-7cl e," ,:T-7 and salaries
and non-waje benefits.
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Rental prices for military equipment (EQUIP) and structures
(STRUC) were derived using r=(d+i)p, where r was the rental price,
d was depreciation, i was the interest rate and p was procurement
costs. Depreciation rates were calculated as a proportion of
beginning year net stock of military equipment or structures. The
government civilian pay factor price was compensation per FTE.
Vietnam War casualties included soldiers killed, wounded or missing
over the 1961-73 period.
Real Gross National Product was obtained from the NIPA
(National Income and Product Accounts) and U.S. population from the
Statistical Abstract. All data were measured on a federal fiscal
year basis and all the financial data were adjusted by '82 fiscal
year basis.
The data for USSR's military end-strength (USSRES) 1963-1986
were obtained from The Military Balance by IISS(The International
Institute for Strategic Studies) [Ref 9] . Since data for USSRES was
not available prior to 1963, in this thesis the time period between
1963 and 1986 was used for selecting and estimating prediction
models of demand for military labor.
Before a stepwise regression analysis was used, several pairs
of ES and candidate predictors were plotted in order to explore the
relationship between these variables.
First of all, Figure 1 shows the trend of ES and USSRES by
year. It indic7te t't - 1 "T ,t .r
strenrth during th
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Observations based on Figure 2 suggest the inclusion of the
higher degree polynomials of USSRES such as USSRES2 and USSRES3 . It
also indicates that the relationship between ES and USSRES is not
simply linear, which implies that Hyphotheses 1 and 2 can be
accepted depending upon the range of USSRES.
Figure 3 shows that a linear relationship between ES & ESI
prevails. As shown in Figure 4, the relationship between the ES and
PARTY during 1963-1986 shows that the Democratic administration was
in favor of larger military forces than the Republican
administration in terms of average size of military labor. This
result might be due to the fact that the Vietnam war occurred
during Democratic administrations. An interesting feature appears
in Figure 5, which indicates the ES as a function of square of war
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Based on these relationships, we consider the following
candidate model for a stepwise selection:
ES=D(USSRES, USSRES2, USSRES3, ESI, RWAR, GNP, MILPAY, EQUIP,
STRUC, CIVP'AY, PARTY)
C. RESULT
The three alternative demand models selected at the 5%
significance level are:
MODEL 1: ES = D (RWAR, ESl)
MODEL 2: ES = D (RWAR, ESI, PARTY)
MODEL 3: ES = D (RWAR, USSRES, USSRES2, USSRES3)
In addition, Deboer and Brorsen's demand model was also fitted
based on the new data set:
MODEL 4 : ES = D (MPAYR, KPEQR, KPSTR, CPAYR, PCGNPR, WAR, CARTER,
NIXFOR, REAGAN)
One of the dummy variables 'KENJOHN' was eliminated from the
analysis due to the changes in the study period.
Estimated demand models are summarized in TABLES 1-4.
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TABLE 1
MMDEL 1 : DEMAND MODEL 1 FOR MILITARY LABOR (1963-1986)
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
SUm OF MEAN
SOURCE DF SQUARES SQUARE F VALUE PROB>F
MODEL 2 5219670.80 2609835.40 132.246 0.0001
ERROR 20 394693.11 19734.65559
C TOTAL 22 5614363.91
ROOT MSE 140.4801 R-SQUARE 0.9297
DEP MEAN 2460.783 ADJ R-SQ 0.9227
C.V. 5.708757
PARAMETER ESTIMATES
PARAMETER STANDARD T FOR HO:
VARIABLE DF ESTIMATE ERROR PARAMETER=0
INTERCEP 1 1389.91738 369.95127 3.757
RWAR 1 94.77674279 25.16514297 3.766
ESI 1 0.35019521 0.16825966 2.081
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22 2135.0 2137.9 35.9622 -2.9343 135.
23 2151.0 2137.6 36.0042 13.4159 135.
24 2143.0 2143.2 35.4218 -0.1873 135.
S TUDENT COOK'S
OBS RESIDUAL -2 -1 0 1 2 D
1
2 2.2978 ] ]**** ] 0.660
3 1.6192 ] ]*** ] 0.207
4 2.5449 ] ] ] 0.268
5 1.6515 ] ]*** ] 0.226
6 -0.3882 ] ] ] 0.029
7 -0.9859 1 *] ] 0.117
8 -0.8030 ] 1 0.056
9 -1.8224 ] ***] ] 0.341
10 -0.9630 ] ] 0.045
11 -0.5777 ] *1 ] 0.006
12 -0.0336 1 ] ] 0.000
13 -0.1561 1 ] ] 0.001
14 -0.3598 1 ] ] 0.003
15 -0.2428 1 ] ] 0.002
16 -0.3860 1 ] ] 0.004
17 -0.6871 ] ] 0.014
18 -0.3606 1 1 1 0.005
19 -0-4387 ] ] 0.006
20 0.0711 ] 1 1 0.000
21 0-0348 1 1 ] 0.000
22 -0.0216 ] ] ] 0.000
23 0.0988 0 ] .000
24 -. 001378 1 1 1 O nno
SUM OF PRESIDUAL2 '.57T7E>-I '
SUM OF SQUAPED RESIDUALS 9.
PPETDICTED ESID S7 (PESS) 605'
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TABLE 2
MODEL 2 : DEMAND MODEL 2 FOP, MILITARY LABOR (1963-1986)
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
SUM OF MEAN
SOURCE DF SQUARES SQUARE F VALUE PROB>F
MODEL 3 5297951.00 1765983.67 106.044 0.0001
ERROR 19 316412.91 16653.31120
C TOTAL 22 5614363.91
ROOT MSE 129.0477 R-SQUARE 0.9436
DEP MEAN 2460.783 ADJ R-SQ 0.9347
C.V. 5.244173
PARAMETER ESTIMATES
PARAMETER STANDARD T FOR HO:
VARIABLE DF ESTIMATE ERROR PARAMETER=0
INTERCEP 1 1327.44806 341.06360 3.892
RWAR 1 78.68183042 24.27990143 3.241
ESI 1 0.41811069 0.15770887 2.651
PARTY 1 -127.79119 58.94205022 -2.168





PREDICT STD ERR STD ERR
OBS ACTUAL VALUE PREDICT RESIDUAL RESIDUAL
1 2700.0
2 2f90.0 2522.2 83.6620 167.8 98.2547
3 2660.0 2554.8 72.7345 105.2 106.6
4 3094.0 2801.0 47.4728 293.0 120.0
5 3 Q .90 321' 7 . , 115.0
6 35 ). 0 79. i0'2 -- : '27 102.7
7 30.Q.n '1O ' 57 .121 -- '1.6 110.2
p33'1 .0 .4 8.247- - -0. 'J75 109r,
9 20 .) 2R74.(9 66.4053 -175.9 110.7
i0 2391.0 2479.5 49.1983 -88.485S2 119.3
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11 2252.0 2285.6 35.9384 -33.5512 123.9
12 2174.0 2141.2 37.6261 32.7579 123.4
13 2130.0 2108.6 37.6305 21.3705 123.4
14 2087.0 2090. 39.3669 -3.2326 122.9
15 2088.0 2072.3 42.1125 15.7461 122.0
16 2069.0 2200.5 51.0575 -131.5 118.5
17 2022.0 2192.5 51.6130 -170.5 118.3
18 2050.0 2172.9 53.6857 -122.9 117.4
19 2049.0 2184.6 52.3345 -135.6 118.0
20 2117.0 2056.4 45.2516 60.6343 120.9
21 2136.0 2084.8 40.0959 51.2028 122.7
22 2135.0 2092.7 39.0621 42.2587 123.0
23 2151.0 2092.3 39.1115 58.6768 123.0
24 2143.0 2099.0 38.3918 43.9870 123.2
STUDENT COOK'S
OBS RESIDUAL -2 -1 0 1 2 D
1
2 1 7080 ] ]*** ] 0.529
3 0.987? ] ] 0.113
4 2.4413 ] ]**** 1 0.233
5 1.5938 0 ]*** ] .164
6 -0.4708 ] ] ] 0.032
7 -1.2763 ] ] 0.152
8 -0-2322 ] ] 0.005
9 -1.5900 ] ***] ] 0.228
10 -0.7417 ] ] 0.023
11 -0.2707 ] ] ] 0.002
12 0.2654 3 ] 1 0.002
13 0.1731 3 ] ] 0.001
14 -0.0263 ] ] ] 0.000
15 0.1291 ] ] ] 0.000
16 -1.1092 3 ] 0.057
17 -1.4417 ) ] 0.099
18 -1.0470 ] **] ] 0.057
19 -1.1493 ] ** ] 0.065
20 0.5017 3 ]* ] 0.009
21 0.4174 1 ] ] 0.005
22 0.3436 ] ] 3 0.003
23 0.4771. ] ] 3 0.006
24 0.3570 ] ] 3 0.003
SUM OF RESIDUALS 1.30740E-12
SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS 316412.9
PREDICTED RESID Sn (PPESA 52zl o co
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TABLE 3
MODEL 3 : DEMAND MODEL 3 FOR MILITARY LABOR (1963-1986)
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
SUM OF MEAN
SOURCE DF SQUARES SQUARE F VALUE PROB>F
MODEL 4 5499513.10 1374878.28 215.478 0.0001
ERROR 18 114850.81 6380.60067
C TOTAL 22 5614363.91
ROOT MSE 79.87866 R-SQUARE 0.9795
DEP MEAN 2460.783 ADJ R-SQ 0.9750
C.V. 3.246067
PARAMETER ESTIMATES
PARAMETER STANDARD T FOR HO:
VARIABLE DF ESTIMATE ERROR PARAMETER=0
INTERCEP 1 29972.09132 8640.50534 3.469
RWAR 1 99.79603626 7.82963188 12.746
USSRES 1 -18.54746417 6.57743880 -2.820
USSRES2 1 0.004045672 0.001648252 2.455
USSRES3 1 -2.89975E-07 1.35350E-07 -2.142






PREDICT STD ERR STD ERR
OBS ACTUAL VALUE PREDICT RESIDUAL RESIDUAL
1 2700.0 2456.7 36.6915
2 2690.0 2485.5 34.9387 204.5 71.8324
3 2C6fl.0 2757.5 57.9980 -97.d,48 54.9258
4 3rO94.r -0 7 ?p o35 69 7121
5 3Arl'>f 327f' K <'"2 1-" rI.4 72.9663
6 3502 r, 529.0 :.265 65.4305
7 -d rn 346 .2 rZ 0725 -'<.1713 67.9007
3161. 3112.3 32.6173 48.7064 72.9158
9 2699.0 2758.0 23.5567 -59.0462 76.3262
28
10 2391.0 2501.5 22.9326 -110.5 76.5160
11 2252.0 2364.2 23.4898 -112.2 76.3468
12 2174.0 2161.3 24.3358 12.7171 76.0813
13 2130.0 2122.0 24.0123 8.0473 76.1840
14 2087.0 2071.7 25.6094 15.3383 75.6622
15 2088.0 2057.1 26.6626 30.8896 75.2974
16 2069.0 2079.0 25.1926 -10.0311 75.8019
17 2022.0 2066.9 25.9196 -44.8882 75.5564
18 2050.0 2066.9 25.9196 -16.8882 75.5564
19 2049.0 2058.2 26.5694 -9.2351 75.3304
20 2117.0 2041.0 28.2381 75.9533 74.7209
21 2136.0 2137.0 53.6261 -0.9595 59.2017
22 2135.0 2143.8 42.9336 -8.7687 67.3595
23 2151.0 2142.9 75.6632 8.1456 25.6062
24 2143.0 2144.9 41.4002 -1.8726 68.3127
STUDENT COOK'S
OBS RESIDUAL -z -1 0 1 2 D
1
2 2.8470 ] * ] 0.384
3 -1-7743 ] ***] ] 0.702
4 0.4782 ] 3 ] 0.014
5 1.7728 ] ]*** 3 0.125
6 -0.4436 ] ] 3 0.019
7 -0-9745 3 *] ] 0.073
8 0.6680 ] ]* 3 0.018
9 -0.7736 ] *] ] 0.011
10 -1.4439 ] **] ] 0.037
11 -1.4692 3 **] ] 0.041
12 0.1672 ] ] ] 0.001
13 0.1056 ] ] ] 0.000
14 0.2027 ] ] ] 0.001
15 0.4102 3 ] 3 0.004
16 -0.1323 ] ] 3 0.000
17 -0.5941 ] *] ] 0.008
18 -0.2235 ] ] 0.001
19 -0.1226 ] ] ] 0.000
20 1.0165 ] ]** 3 0.030
21 -0.0162 ] 3 3 0.000
22 -0.1302 ] ] ] 0.001
23 0.3181 ] ] ] 0.177
24 -0.0274 ] 3 ] 0.000
SUM OF RESIDUALS 5.41149E-10
SUM OF SQUARED PEVIDUALS TjAP5" q
PREDICTED RESID 1O (PPES9<
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TABLE 4
MODEL 4 : DEBOER and BRORSEN's DEMAND MODEL (1963-1986)
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
SUM OF MEAN
SOURCE DF SQUARES SQUARE F VALUE PROB>F
MODEL 9 5537871.24 615319.03 87.375 0.0001
ERROR 12 84507.53439 7042.29453
C TOTAL 21 5622378.77
ROOT MSE 83.91838 R-SQUARE 0.9850
DEP MEAN 2447.682 ADJ R-SQ 0.9737
C.V. 3.428484
PARAMETER ESTIMATES
PARAMETER STANDARD T FOR HO:
VARIABLE DF ESTIMATE ERROR PARAMETER=0
INTERCEP 1 3077.07489 1054.36949 3.772
MPAYR 1 -J.04693228 0.03682841 -1.274
KPEQP ] 1428.17944 731.28161 1.953
KPSTR . -1448.68051 697.32834 -2.077
CPAYR ± -0.08459454 0.05623848 -1.504
PCGNPR 1 0-11597559 0.06810544 1.703
WAR 1 7.66143836 1.35536513 5.653
CARTER 1 115.13584 234.57099 0.491
NI'IFOR 1 218.17385 193.32807 1.129
PEAGAN 1 247.94413 216.90492 1.143











FPr 'T 7 TT, P.P STD ERP
OBS ACTrTAL, VALUE PFEDICT FF.- UTAL RESIDUAL
1 2700.0 2856.6 108.2
2 2687.0 2752.2 78.1640
30
3 2655.0 2768-7 63.1526 -113.7 55.2633
4 3094.0 2983.8 52.0196 110.2 65.8502
5 3377.0 3313.0 48.9035 64.0433 68.1963
6 3548.0 3586.5 65.3137 -38.5259 52.6917
7 3460.0 3482.1 67.9300 -22.0705 49.2728
8 3066.0 3105.1 71.5604 -39.1345 43.8338
9 2715.0 2623.0 47.5441 92.0227 69.1510
10 2323.0 2238.6 52.6729 84.3591 65.3288
11 2253.0 2231.6 49.7622 21.4209 67.5723
12 2162.0 2281.1 57.0059 -119.1 61.5843
13 2128.0 2114.7 46.6425 13.3006 69.7623
14 2082.0 2101.1 44.8049 -19.1433 70.9564
15 2075.0 2108.7 64.7580 -33.7203 53.3732
16 2062.0 2047.5 67.1964 14.5303 50.2687
17 2027.0 2099.7 45.5062 -72.6791 70.5087
18 2051.0 2086.4 53.0829 -35.4447 64.9962
19 2083.0 1989.4 66.6688 93.5936 50.9663
20 2109.0 2112.1 63.7102 -3.0564 54.6196
21 2123.0 2149.8 50.0197 -26.7758 67.3820
22 2138.0 2171.3 46.2909 -33.2621 69.9961
23 2151.0 2136.5 44.7965 14.4874 70.9617
24 2167.0 2118.4 60.3257 48.6069 58.3361
STUDENT COOK'S
(BS RESIDUAL -2 -1 0 1 2 D
1
2
3 -2.0572 ] ] 0.553
4 1-6741 ] ]*** ] 0.175
5 0.9391 ] ] 0.045
6 -0-7312 ] *1 ] 0.082
7 -0.4479 ] ] ] 0.038
8 -0.8928 ] *1 ] 0.212
9 1.3308 ] * 0.084
10 1.2913 ] ] 0.108
11 0.3170 ] 1 ] 0.005
12 -1.9340 ] ***] ] 0.320
13 0-1907 3 ] ] 0.002
14 -0.2698 3 ] ] 0.003
15 -0.6318 ] *1 ] 0.059
16 0.2891 ] ] ] 0.015
17 -1-0308 ] **] 1 0.044
18 -0-5453 ] ] 0.020
19 1.8364 1 ] ] 0.577
20 -0.0560 0 .0
22 -r)7.1 1 ] 1
2. ...~ ] 1 ] ;
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STM OF RESIDUALS 2.27942E-11
SUM OF SQUARED PESIDUALS 84507.53
PREDICTED RESID SS (PRESS) 334894.5
First of all, many of the independent variables in Deboer and
Brorsen' s model (Table 4) turned out to be statistically
insignificant: MPAY(O.23), CPAYR(0.16), CARTER(0.63), NIXFORD
(0.28), REAGAN(0.28) . It indicated that Deboer and Brorsen's model
is sensitive to the change of time horizon that covers the
analysis. A more robust model was necessary for prediction
purposes.
In comparison to their model, Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3
are parsinomious and have all significant predictors. In order to
compare the robustness of the three models, this thesis used PRESS.
The definition of PRESS (Predicted Residual Sum of Squares) is the
squared sum of the ith residuals divided by (1-h) where h is the
leverage above, and residuals are obtained from the model has been




where N= number of observations
Model 1 ;
Average Prediction Error ___1__
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Model 2
Average Prediction Error = 521969 =154
N 22
Model 3
Averacre Prediction Error = 198675 =5
In terms of press, this study found that Model 3 has the
smallest error for prediction of the military labor demand.
Tsing the actual data (1987-1990), we compared the prediction
s iccess of these three models in terms of mean square error(MSE).
TABIJE 5
THE MEAN SQUAPE ERROR FOR THREE ALTERNATIVE DEMAND MODEL
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MQDEL 3
YEAP, (S-ES) ( -ES)2 E
1987 310.26 3885.27 116.1
1988 244.57 787.38 4647.2
1989 1673.15 95.77 17448.0
1990 260.73 888.02 26250.7
MSE 622.173 1414.11 12115.5
ES:- Estimated ES based on the model.
Table 5 shows th P' Ae] - = -he j. = -- . I .T 7 hT
the smalleast MSTF wb ich cl-)nt raict h es+ _ " ',tined usingi
PPE$ It can be attributable t- thie changed patterns in USSRES's
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end-strength 4.n the late 1980s compared to 1960s through early
1980s. If USSR's end-strength has increased with the similar trend
as before, Model 3 might have resulted in the minimum MSE. However
that is not the case. Under the current situation, Model 1 seems to
provide better predictions than Model 3.
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IV. MILITARY LABOR SIMULATION
The following simulations were designed to assess implications
of the demand models for manpower planning through the year 2000.
Simulations were run to test the impact of war casualties, USSR's
end-strength and bipartisan administrations on military labor
demand. In the simulation, four different scenarios that reflect
the possible combinations of war casualties, USSR's end-strength
and presidential administration were considered.
The simulation assumed a 1 percent, 2 percent, and 5 percent
annual decrease in USSR's end-strength and no war in scenario 1-3,
respectively. The presidential administration was assumed that
there will be a republican administration until 1995, then a
democratic administration will appear during 1996-1999. In scenario
4, it was assumed that there will be a war from 1994 to 1996 and
the annual decrease rate of USSR's end-strength is 1 percent.
During the war, 7200 war casualties were expected. Details
regarding four scenarios and resulting U.S. end-strength are in
TABLE 6-TABLE 9. Simulation results are shown in Figure 6-Figure 9.
Predicted patterns of U.S. end-strength (PREESI and PREES2) in
Figure 6-8 correspond to scenario 1, 2 and 3. According to model 1,
U.S. end-strength (PREESI) is expected to decrease from 2,160,000
in 1991 to 2,138,000 in 2000 while model p --' , the impact of
the possible chance in bi#-rtiar adiTitrati-T (from Republican
to Democratic administration) on the future demand of end-strength.
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Model 3 has been examined under three different scenarios (1,
2 and 3) regarding the changing USSR's end-strength along with no
war assumption. The resulting patterns in Figure 6 and 7 show that
decrease in the predicted U.S. end-strength in the first two years
(1991 and 1992) and the subsequent increase between 1993 and 2000
under scenario 1 and 2 while except for 1991, continuous increase
is predicted under scenario 3. Under the scenario 1, model 3
consistently predicts the lowest annual end-strength among three
models considered. However, under scenario 2 and 3, annual end-
strength increases more rapidly than that under scenario 1.
Figure 7 indicates that PREES3 starts to exceed PREESI in 1996
while Figure 8 shows that PRESS3 overrides PRESS1 from 1993.
Figure 9 which corresponds to scenario 4 can be compared to
Figure 6 which shows the patterns of predicted end-strength under
scenario 1. Differences between scenario 1 and 4 are the expected
numbers of war casualties. Under scenario 4, model 1, 2 and 3
provide similar trends during the possible war, which indicates the
contribution of the expected number of war casualties on the
predicted demand for U.S. end-strength.
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TABLE 6
SIMULATION RESULT 1 : SCENARIO 1
SCENARIO 1 END-STRENGTH
YEAR WAR PARTY USSRES PREESI PREES2 PREES3
1991 0 1 3948 2160 2108 1991
1992 0 1 3908 2146 2081 1968
1993 0 1 3869 2141 2069 1978
1994 0 1 3830 2139 2065 1989
1995 0 1 3792 2139 2063 2002
1996 0 0 3754 2139 2190 2017
1997 0 0 3717 2139 2243 2035
1998 0 0 3679 2138 2265 2054
1999 0 0 3643 2138 2274 2075
2000 0 1 3606 2138 2150 2099
PREES i: Predicted End-Strength based on model i.
USSRES: Annual decrease rate, 1 percent.
WAP: No war.
TABLE 7
SIMULATION RESULT 2 : SCENARIO 2
SCENARIO 2 END-STRENGTH
YEAR WAR PARTY USSRES PREESI PREES2 PREES3
1991 0 1 3908 2160 2108 1998
1992 0 1 3830 2146 2081 1989
1993 0 1 3753 2141 2069 2018
1994 0 1 3678 2139 2065 2055
1995 0 1 3604 2139 2063 2100
1996 0 0 3532 2139 2190 2154
1997 0 0 3462 2139 2243 2217
1998 0 0 3392 2138 2265 2289
1999 0 0 3324 2138 2274 2369
2000 0 1 3258 2138 2150 2458
USSRES: Annual icrease ret'e, 1' ..
WAR : No war.
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TABLE 8
SIMULATION RESULT 3 : SCENARIO 3
SCENARIO 3 END-STRENGTH
YEAR WAR PARTY USSRES PREESI PREES2 PREES3
1991 0 1 3788 2160 2108 2033
1992 0 1 3599 2146 2081 2104
1993 0 1 3419 2141 2069 2260
1994 0 1 3248 2139 2065 2473
1995 0 1 3085 2139 2063 2741
1996 0 0 2931 2139 2190 3062
1997 0 0 2784 2139 2243 3432
1998 0 0 2645 2138 2265 3849
1999 0 0 2513 2138 2274 4307
2000 0 1 2387 2138 2150 4803
USSRES: Annual decrease rate, 5 percent.
WAR: No war.
TABLE 9
SIMULATION RESULT 4 : SCENARIO 4
SCENARIO 4 END-STRENGTH
YEAR I WAR PARTY USSRES PREESI PREES2 PREES3
1991 0 1 3948 2160 2108 1991
1992 0 1 3908 2146 2081 1968
1993 0 1 3869 2141 2069 1978
1994 1.5 1 3830 2139 2065 1989
1995 3.5 1 3792 2281 2181 2152
1996 2.2 0 3754 2520 2514 2366
1997 0 0 3717 2481 2552 2254
1998 0 0 3679 2258 2394 2054
1999 0 0 3643 2180 2328 2075
2000 0 1 3606 2153 2173 2099
USSRES: Annual decrease rate, 1 percent.
WAR: 7200 war c~suaities wer: :rec + z
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PLOT OF PPEES1*YP. SYMBOL USED IS 1
PLOT OF PREES2*YR SYMBOL USED IS 2
PLOT OF PREES3*YR SYMBOL USED IS 3
2300 +
-- - - - - - - - - - - -- - -
YP.
Fioure C. The P)-- - f PF.31, E2 .'TII2 "-* z
for Scenario- 1.
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PLOT OF PREES1*YR SYMBOL USED IS 1
PLOT OF PREES2*YR SYMBOL USED IS 2




PLOT OF PREES1*YR SYMBOL USED IS 1
PLOT OF PREES2*YR SYMBOL USED IS 2
PLOT OF PREES3*YR SYMBOL USED IS 3
£ FEE7 I
111 4 1 1 1
Firnre 8. The P)--t -'f FiE, F..ZPRE3evs YEAR
f r cenari, 3
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PLOT OF PREES1*YR SYMBOL USED IS 1
PLOT OF PREES2*YR SYMBOL USED IS 2









Misassessment of demand for defense manpower can cause
disastrous consequences. In this thesis, prediction models for U.S.
military labor demand are formulated in terms of war casualties,
bipartisan administration, the past year's U.S. end-strength and
USSR's end-strength. If changes in USSR's end-strength in the 1990s
are similar to those in the 1960s through the early 1980s, Model 3,
D(USSRES, USSRES2, USSRES3, RWAR) can be used as a robust
prediction model. An interesting finding in Model 3 is U.S. end-
strength as a function of a third degree of polynomial USSR's end-
strength and square root of the number of war casualties.
Recent unprecedented changes in the USSR, however, may deter
us from using Model 3 to decide demand for U.S. end-strength in the
near future. For a short term prediction, Model 1 [D(ES1, RWAR) ] or
Model 2 (D(ES1, RWAR, PARTY)] may provide better predictions than
Model 3.
In comparison to the existing models, prediction models
considered in this thesis are relatively parsinomious but provide
accurate predictions. Although these models were considered for
U.S. end-strenath, similar considerations can be made for the
prediction of military labor demand in other countries. Results of
simulation studies can be used to assist defense m;npower policy.
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